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Geographies of Connection 
and Disconnection: Narratives 
of Seafaring in Lý Sơn
Edyta Roszko
An unexpected sea breeze coming from the north on a Friday 
morning in June 2014 promised a bit of respite from the heat on Lý 
Sơn Island, located about 30 kilometres offshore from Quảng Ngãi 
Province in Vietnam and 123 nautical miles (ca. 228 km) from the 
Paracel Archipelago.1 Every Friday and Saturday, I sipped my morning 
coffee in one of the local café shops near the port, updated myself 
on village affairs, and observed the stream of Vietnamese tourists 
flowing from the ship onto the seashore. Most of them were taken 
by cars to newly built hotels and small guesthouses that quickly 
filled up with organised tour groups, mainly from Hà Nô ̣i and Hô ̀ Chí 
Minh City. Due to China’s repeated confiscation of Lý Sơn’s fishing 
vessels and harassment of their fishermen, Lý Sơn Island had become 
1  The research for this chapter was funded by the People Programme (Marie Curie Actions) 
of the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under REA grant 
agreement no PIEF-GA-2012-326795. This paper is also partially based on a 12-month period 
of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2006–07 in Lý Sơn, which received financial support 
from the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle. The author also wishes to 
acknowledge support from the 2014 Vietnam Update organisers and particularly thanks Philip 
Taylor for his close reading and many invaluable comments that have greatly improved this 
chapter. Oscar Salemink, Li Tana, and the two anonymous readers also deserve special mention 
for their thoughtful comments on the chapter.
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a putative symbol of  ‘defending  sovereignty’ over the ‘East Sea’ 
— the Vietnamese name for the South China Sea (Roszko 2015) — 
and became a destination for tourists eager to show their solidarity 
with the islanders who bore the brunt of the defence of the nation’s 
sovereignty.
A group of eight women in their late 50s who I met that Friday serve 
as an example of a new style of patriotic tourism in coastal areas that 
has become increasingly popular among urban Vietnamese. This kind 
of tourism — which is both secular and ritual — involves travelling to 
the country’s islands in order to experience the sea environment, food, 
and patriotism through entertainment and commemorative activities 
in spaces designated and designed by the state for remembering. 
The eight retired correctional police officers (công an điều chỉnh) from 
Hà Nội, Nha Trang, Buôn Ma Tuô ̣t, and Pleiku arranged with Lý Sơn 
authorities to meet with selected ‘poor fishing families’ and award a 
small sum of money to children who had achieved high grades in the 
village school. Following a new patriotic slogan, ‘the whole Vietnamese 
nation turns to the sea’ (ca ̉ Việt Nam hướng về biển), these women told 
me that they considered Lý Sơn Island to be the ‘navel of the nation’ 
(rôn bao của cả nước Việt Nam) and wanted to express their solidarity 
with local fishermen, whose months-long detention by China had been 
widely covered in Vietnam’s national media. In Vietnam’s traditional 
conception of the human body, the ‘human body [is] a microcosmic 
reproduction of the vast dynamic forces at work in the universe’ 
(Marr 1987:28), and the navel is considered the centre of the body. By 
calling Lý Sơn Island the navel of the nation, the erstwhile ‘excentric’ 
island has become the imagined centre of the country’s geo-body. 
How could a marginal place such as Lý Sơn Island become the nation’s 
navel in so few years?
Introduction
Although there are historical records of the presence of Lý Sơn 
Islanders on the Paracels acting on behalf of a Vietnamese polity (see 
Lê Quý Ðơn 1972; Bô ̣ Ngoa ̣i Giao Uy ̉ Ban Biên Giới Quô ́c Gia 2013), 
the conflict with China over the South China Sea has opened up a 
new maritime frontier that did not exist before — at least not in the 
same manner. Back in 2006 when I carried out my doctoral fieldwork, 
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few people had heard about Lý Sơn, and I observed few Vietnamese 
or foreign tourists visiting the island. However, eight years later, 
the conflict over the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and Spratly (Trường Sa) 
archipelagos, with repercussions at local, national, and international 
levels, had inscribed the island at the centre of Vietnam’s history 
and geography, and as the destination for thousands of Vietnamese 
tourists from all over the country. For many Vietnamese, the island 
was at the centre of a re-imagined map of the nation’s territory, which 
now included both the land and the sea. Considered as a historic and 
contemporary stepping stone to the far-flung Paracels, Lý Sơn found 
itself in the middle of Vietnam’s imagined maritime and territorial 
geo-body, as brought out, for instance, in iconographic depictions of 
Vietnam’s map in daily televised weather reports. Lý Sơn thus became 
a figurative cartographic navel of the national geo-body.
The reason for this discursive connection between Lý Sơn and 
the Paracels can be traced back to the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, and throughout the nineteenth century, when specific 
seafaring communities, including from Lý Sơn, were given the right 
to collect goods from wrecked ships in exchange for the best share of 
the spoils for Vietnam’s rulers, thus giving both rulers and fishermen 
a material stake in and presence on the Paracel islands (Wheeler 2006). 
This connection was formalised through the Hoàng Sa (Paracel) navy, 
which consisted of sailors recruited from Lý Sơn Island (Lê Quý Ðơn 
1972:210). Many of the Hoàng Sa sailors died at sea and their bodies 
were never returned to their relatives, giving rise to special ritual and 
memorial practices in Lý Sơn. 
In the context of tensions with China over competing claims over the 
South China Sea during the early 1990s, the Vietnamese State turned 
its attention towards Lý Sơn as a valuable source of information about 
the sailors of the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa navies (Roszko 2010). A few 
years later, it issued a directive establishing a memorial site for the 
two flotillas. Facing rival claims from China to sovereignty over the 
archipelagos, the Vietnamese Party-state chose to frame its strategy 
not in economic terms, but with reference to historical and emotional 
stories of Vietnamese sailors who had sacrificed their lives at sea. 
Through gradually revealed family genealogies which are expected to 
shed new light on Vietnam’s putative long-standing sovereignty in 
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the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, members of Lý Sơn lineages have 
worked hard to recentre their marginal(ised) locality on the imagined 
map of the national territory — this time including the sea. 
Historian Dian Murray (1988:4) points out that uninhabited islands 
constituted little concern for neo-Confucian states such as China or 
Vietnam, where sovereignty was typically defined in terms of human 
habitation and social organisation. According to this view, the Paracels 
and Spratlys were considered by Chinese and Vietnamese imperial 
governments as a maritime hazard for safe navigation rather than as an 
integrated part of national territory. This changed in postcolonial times. 
The colonial encounter had a transformative effect on many Asian 
states, which were pushed to recognise the need for creating their own 
national geo-body — both the territory and the nation — through 
mapping, and thus crafting an outline of the map as a national symbol 
(Winichakul 1994; Roszko 2015). The current conflict with China over 
the South China Sea evokes strong emotions in Vietnam, where many 
people assert feelings of affection for the ‘ancestral’ grounds of the 
— largely uninhabited and uninhabitable — islands and islets of the 
Hoàng Sa (Paracels) and Trường Sa (Spratlys). As I describe elsewhere, 
repeated Chinese seizure of Vietnamese vessels and the detention of Lý 
Sơn fishermen has been widely covered in Vietnam’s mass media in the 
last five years, adding fuel to an already heated mediated debate about 
the disputed archipelagos in the South China Sea (Roszko 2015). At the 
same time, by designating officially approved spaces for expressing 
feelings of national pride, the Vietnamese state uses all possible means 
to encourage Vietnamese people’s identification with the expansion 
of Vietnam’s territory to include the contested waters in the South 
China Sea. 
Against the backdrop of the South China Sea dispute, this chapter 
examines what kind of shift in subjectivities is required of Lý Sơn 
people to navigate the state’s project and new economic opportunities 
that have emerged with the growing national interest in the island’s 
historical and cultural heritage. How does the Lý Sơn community 
actively recentre itself on the imagined map of the nation’s geo-body 
in its desire to become part of the modern world? As I demonstrate, 
people in nationally significant sites such as this have their own 
agendas and interpretations of history that favour local identities 
over all-embracing state visions (O’Connor 2003:271). In order to 
capture these processes at work, I open my discussion by exploring 
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territorial imaginaries associated with ‘Vietnameseness’ and spiritual 
and hierarchical boundaries between two modes of life — farming 
and fishing. In the subsequent section, I focus on the islanders’ 
gradual marginalisation in post-revolutionary Vietnam and their 
various aspirations to break their provincial status as fishermen by 
claiming the identity of traders and explorers as a way of life. In the 
final section, I analyse how Lý Sơn villagers position themselves in 
the context of Vietnam’s novel rhetoric that redefines the country 
from a rice-growing culture to a maritime nation. Ultimately, I suggest 
that islanders seek to produce their own version of locality against 
the backdrop of the territorial dispute and their victimisation by the 
Chinese coastguard, widely projected in the national media.
Territorial Imaginaries 
Colonial sources produced influential territorial imaginaries of 
Vietnam, centred on the terrestrial rice-growing Red River Delta as 
‘the cradle of Vietnamese civilisation’. This era is also the source of the 
cliché of the Vietnamese village as a politically autonomous, socially 
homogenous corporate community surrounded by a hedge and rice 
paddies (for example, Gourou 1936, 1940; McAlister and Mus 1970; 
Kleinen 1999). Moreover, the classic tripartite division of Vietnam 
into North, Centre, and South, metaphorically characterised by ‘“two 
rice baskets on a pole” — to describe the agrarian rich North and 
South held together by the poor but hard-working Centre’ is still alive 
in many historical accounts (Wheeler 2006:129–130). Keith Taylor 
(1998:971) has spoken against the ‘pan-Vietnamese village morphology’ 
that produces the hierarchy defined as ‘Vietnamese’ and points out 
different ways of acting Vietnamese that existed through space and 
time. Taylor’s (1998) critique of representations of Vietnamese history, 
culture, and territory as affirming unity and continuity is echoed in 
the work of Charles Wheeler (2006), Li Tana (2006) and John Whitmore 
(2006) and their attention to the coast. By conceptualising the littoral 
as a fluid rather than solid zone they offer a new perspective on 
Vietnamese society seen from the sea. Like the littoral, which is in a 
constant state of flux, this society must be seen as fluid and flexible as 
well (Pearson 1985, 2003).
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My own ethnographic work in coastal communities shows that 
potent intersections of religion, economy, politics, and ecology are 
particularly visible in such a contact zone where the state struggles 
to establish and increase its presence (Roszko 2011). The very idea 
of ‘Vietnameseness’ tends to underplay the regional, historical, and 
cultural differences, and to marginalise places such as Lý Sơn Island 
that are seen as representing an extreme, unusual, and unsettled 
situation that does not stand for the imagined Vietnamese territory and 
nation. The spatial marginality and ambivalence of such communities 
remains a major concern of the state, which tries to incorporate them 
through various cultural agendas and development programs, such as 
the already mentioned patriotic tourism. For instance, after several 
ports in China started to operate regular tours to the disputed Paracel 
archipelago, Vietnam’s Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
responded by approving an ambitious project aiming to develop 
Vietnam ‘into a strong sea-based country, enriched by sea’ and protect 
national sovereignty.2 In the context of an imagined or real threat from 
China, many urban Vietnamese book tours to unpopular islands that 
were previously only loosely connected to the Vietnamese geo-body 
in order to — at least once in their life — experience the fatherland as 
seen from the sea.3 
In response to uneven access to education, healthcare, or basic 
infrastructure, along with China’s exclusionary claims on resources in 
the South China Sea, Lý Sơn people appropriate and capitalise on these 
national and geopolitical narratives in order to reproduce and relocate 
their locality in a desired way. The commemoration related to Hoàng 
Sa, which more recently has received the status of ‘national heritage’, 
provides the opportunity for Lý Sơn villagers to demonstrate the 
historical and communal value of their genealogies and temples, and 
reshape and redefine their local narratives and social identity beyond 
the category of fishermen. According to local family records (gia phả) 
the first 15 Việt families came from the mainland in 1609, divided land 
between them, and established two villages, An Hải and An Vĩnh, 
2  www.hanoitourist.com.vn/english/sea-travel/1817-sea-and-islands-a-driving-force-for-viet- 
nam-tourism-development, accessed 4 September 2015.
3  english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/travel/12151/marine--island-tours-chosen-to-show-patriotism.
html, accessed 4 September 2015.
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which nowadays form two communes.4 However, a source of anxiety 
for the islanders was the awareness that the Việt people on Lý Sơn 
Island were only the latest residents in a long history of settlement, 
and that archaeological evidence indicates that the Cham civilisation 
was present prior to the Việt arrival on Lý Sơn. Islanders assuaged 
such unsettled feelings by seeking to convey a sense of genealogical 
continuity with the mainland. During my conversations with the 
islanders, many of them betrayed a sense of awkwardness about the 
previous Cham presence, which is indisputable taking into account 
archaeological evidence. A Lý Sơn villager told me:
In the past, Bình Thuận was the place of origin for the Cham people 
but from there they spread to central parts entering Ðà Nẵng and 
Quảng Nam. In Lý Sơn there was not so many of them, so [the land] 
out here was intact. There was no one to have an exchange with at 
all. For that reason in the sixteenth and seventeenth century the Việt 
people occupied Champa and stayed there. Well, back then, people 
from all provinces were moving in and out … to other provinces. There 
were also people here [on the island] and the Cham also came here but 
then [Việt] occupied the islands. After that [Cham] did not come here 
anymore, they were not able to [laughing] … The Việt caught crabs, 
fish and snails which they ate through the day to survive. When more 
Việt occupied the island and stayed here the civil harmony began with 
Champa people.
When I asked what he meant by the ‘civil harmony with Champa’, 
he replied:
Still, there were a few Champa people here, they lived on this land. 
After those regarded as Champa died, they did not enter the island 
anymore, they were gone so the Việt people flocked together here. 
The passage quoted above is not an isolated example of the awkwardness 
associated with the previous Cham presence on the island. It reveals 
an immediate defensive reaction by islanders who tried to convince 
me of the absence of Cham people at the time when their ancestors 
arrived on the island. Despite the historical evidence that Champa 
consisted of several coastal states which occupied the south-central 
4  See, for example, Gia Phả — Hộ Võ Văn (Family annals — Hộ Võ Văn) kept by the Võ Văn 
lineage, An Vi ̃nh Commune, Lý Sơn District, Qua ̉ng Ngãi Province or Gia Phả — Hộ Phạm Văn 
(Family annals — Hộ Phạm Văn) kept by the Phạm Văn lineage, An Vĩnh Commune, Lý Sơn 
District, Quảng Ngãi Province.
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coast of Vietnam from the end of the first millennium BC (Southworth 
2004; Vickery 2009; Hardy 2009), many islanders maintained that 
the Cham were originally concentrated only in the southern part of 
Vietnam, in present-day Bình Thuận Province. Many villagers claimed 
that those Cham who stayed on the island gradually vanished and, 
generally, the Việt people outnumbered them. In this way, Lý Sơn 
people wanted to clear up any doubts about their identity, the rights 
over the land, or possible violence in the settlement process on the 
island. Yet, the surnames such as Mai, Ðinh, Tiêu, etc., suggest that 
the Vietnamese migrants on Lý Sơn Island intermixed with the Cham 
natives (very few of whom still lived in the area). In the process — 
masking their Cham origin — the descendants of these inter-ethnic 
marriages absorbed and retained most of the beliefs of the agrarian 
villages from which their Viẹt forefathers had come. 
While contemporary residents took possession of islands as Việt 
territory by means of a Việt-centric settlement history, villagers 
were grappling with the problematic notion of Cham predecessors, 
which unsettled their sense of territoriality. Indeed, as some authors 
argue, control over territory ‘is not only about use or power; it is 
also about meaning, claiming, consolidating, legitimacy’ (Vaccaro, 
Dawson and Zanotti 2014:3). Intriguingly, we obtain a very different 
understanding of how villagers emplace themselves in Lý Sơn history 
by considering their ritual relations with the Cham spirits that are 
to this day worshipped in many temples on the island. The ritual 
relationship with these spirits, predicated on the existence of a more 
powerful spiritual domain, was maintained through the ritual ‘buying 
or renting land’ (lễ tả thô) (Li Tana 1998:131; Tạ Chí Ðài Trường 
2005:264). Right into the twentieth century, the inhabitants of Lý Sơn 
performed a ‘ritualised bargain’ through a local ‘sorcerer’ with a Cham 
ancestral couple, Chúa Ngu Ma Nương, and made lavish sacrifices in 
order to keep the land fertile (cf. Li Tana 1998:131; Tạ Chí Ðài Trường 
2005). One of the oldest inhabitants of Lý Sơn Island described the 
ceremony concerning land ownership in the following words:
In the past, the North of Lý Sơn belonged to the Cham Kingdom 
[Chiêm Thành]. Our Kinh forefathers fought with the Cham Kingdom 
who were defeated and had to leave their land. The land remained and 
it was sacred [linh thiêng]; if our ancestors who wanted to inhabit it 
refused to worship them [the Cham deities] they would bring serious 
illnesses upon the village. That is why the forefathers installed an altar 
355
10 . GEOGRAPHIES OF CONNECTION AND DISCONNECTION
[on the old Cham territory] for a wife and husband Chúa Ngu Man 
Nương. The couple managed the land and every five years the village 
organised the ritual of ‘request for land’ during which many oxen and 
buffalo had to be offered to keep peace. The ceremony was great and 
lasted several days and nights. The sorcerer [phù thuỷ] was invited 
too. He called the couple and asked them if they were satisfied with 
the offerings. If they said ‘yes’ they could stop but if they said ‘no’ 
they had to continue to make sacrifices of animals. The land belonged 
to them, without the offerings the village would be punished. If the 
husband required five pigs they would give him exactly five pigs. 
When queried about this they responded: ‘the husband was easygoing 
but to satisfy his wife was very difficult!’ 
By performing the large ceremony for the Cham spirits, such as the 
Uma Goddess and Chúa Ngu Ma Nương,5 the newcomers established 
themselves not only as rightful patrons of the new land but also tacitly 
apologised for taking this land away from the Cham natives. As the 
new owners of the territory they ritually accommodated the fact that 
other inhabitants once ruled over the land and its fertility. Through 
ritual procedures the spirits were pacified and incorporated into the 
pantheon of the new dominant community that gained local power. 
The new experience of the sea and the encounter with Cham 
civilisation prompted the Việt on Lý Sơn Island not only to adopt 
foreign spirits and beliefs into their own religious practices but also to 
willingly experiment with the material culture of their predecessors. 
Viê ̣t migrants learned seafaring techniques from the Cham and 
even the structure of their ships followed Cham principles (Li Tana 
1998:112; Pham, Blue and Palmer 2010; Pham 2013). Local  family 
annals (gia phả) provide information from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries that, due to the excellent seafaring capacity 
of the islanders, many were recruited by the feudal state to collect 
precious sea products and goods from wrecked ships in the Paracel and 
Spratly archipelagos. The eighteenth-century Vietnamese historian 
Lê Quý Ðôn (1972:210) reported the case of Vietnamese sailors who 
were allowed to move to Lý Sơn and were granted royal concession 
to explore the sea. Such practices were not unique to Vietnam, but 
also took place in other regions of Southeast Asia. In his interesting 
account on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century migration and 
5  Uma Goddess is the name for the Hindu Great Goddess Paravati, usually associated with 
mountains. Chúa Ngu Ma Nương is a Cham spirit of a husband and wife. 
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trade practices of ‘sea people’ in Southwest Kalimantan, Atsushi 
Ota (2010:69) writes that during this period many migrants, called 
‘pirates’ by Europeans, established their communities in the coastal 
areas and ‘were engaged in various profitable activities such as trade, 
fishing, and cultivation, supplemented by occasional raids on traders, 
fishermen, and the villagers’. By calling these maritime migrant 
communities ‘sea people’, Atsushi Ota (2010:69) makes an interesting 
point that those communities were ‘within the political reach of states 
and settled under state rulers’ approval, but they were not completely 
politically integrated, maintaining privileges in certain activities, 
such as settlement in certain places and plundering’. This resembles 
the case of Lý Sơn, with its loose connection to the mainland’s political 
apparatus. As already mentioned, this connection was formalised as 
the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa navy, consisting of villagers recruited 
from Lý Sơn Island who operated in the vicinity of the Paracels 
and Spratlys, which today constitute the fishing grounds of Lý Sơn 
fishermen (Lê Quý Ðôn 1972:203, 210). 
The Dichotomy Between the Land and 
the Sea
Trần Quốc Vượng (1992:29) notes that in pre-colonial and colonial 
Vietnam, fishing was a despised occupation and fishermen constituted 
one of the most marginalised groups in society. Landless, without roots 
in the village and living in areas close to the sea and rivers, fishermen 
were discriminated against and deprived of the spiritual and material 
means offered by the village. The dichotomy between the land and the 
sea that constitutes Lý Sơn society is expressed in the two emic terms: 
làng and vạn. Traditionally, làng or ‘village’ constituted the territorial 
unit of Vietnamese society, with the political and ritual system 
localised in the đình (communal house), and represented a land-based 
lifestyle. In the đình, villagers spiritually ensured good harvest for the 
upcoming year through the worship of those who first broke the land 
under the plough (tiền hiền) and the founders of the village (tiền hậu).6 
6  In central and southern Vietnam, communal houses were characteristically erected in 
honour of the tiền hiền and the tiền hâ ̣u: those who first broke the land under the plough and 
the founders of the village. Where the communal house was a northern đình it was a shrine for 
the village guardian spirit. The guardian spirit of the village, or thành hòang, worshipped in the 
northern đình could be either a historical or a mythical person.
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Generally, in central Vietnam, vạn referred both to a self-ruling fishing 
organisation and to a territorial unit with its own religious system 
localised in the lăng, a temple for the cult of a seafaring guardian 
spirit — the Whale. The fact that lăng means ‘tomb’ speaks volumes 
about fishermen’s concerns, as if through propitiating the Whale Spirit 
they sought protection rather than seeking to ensure and control the 
fertility of land and, hence, the village.
Lack of arable land and inability to grow rice is an important detail 
that sheds new light on the formation of categories such as làng and 
vạn in Lý Sơn. In the face of serious physical constraints to growing 
rice, islanders still tried to reproduce the hierarchical division between 
farmers and fishermen that they knew from the mainland. Coming 
from the northern coast of Thanh Hóa, Nghệ An, and Hà Tĩnh, some 
of the ‘founders’ and ‘great lineages’ might have had the lower status 
of fishermen, but in the new setting, by taking advantage of being 
first, they established themselves as a superior làng. The recognised 
descendants of the ‘founders’ formed dominant lineages and an 
unofficial channel of grassroots administration — chiefs of hamlets 
(xóm) and sub-hamlets (lân) — that operated as ‘patrilineages’ of 
the village. Other lineages that were ranked alongside the ‘founders’ 
but did not win the same power were those whose precursors came 
shortly after the founders; these lineages were called tộc lớn, or ‘great 
lineages’. This hierarchical stratification survives on the island until 
today and is displayed in religious and ritual practices. All of these 
groups recorded their genealogies (gia phả) in the ancestral halls 
of individual lineages. Others, who might have been fishermen or 
peasants, were not admitted to the đình order and did not share equal 
rights as village members because they arrived much later than the 
‘founders’ and ‘great lineages’ and did not have access to free land. 
They were required to obtain permission from the ‘founders’ or ‘great 
lineages’ to buy a plot of land and build a house on the territory of 
the village, but even in such cases they were not considered legitimate 
village members. Denied village membership, they joined forces and 
formed a vạn with its own civil code, although still subordinated to 
the village. 
In contrast to mainland central Vietnam, where fishing communities 
occupied sandy dunes and could be easily distinguished from 
agricultural villages with their surrounding rice fields, fishing and 
farming settlements on Lý Sơn Island merged because of the lack of 
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arable land for rice cultivation. More precisely, the two ‘municipalities’ 
of An Vĩnh and An Hải were established in the seventeenth century 
as two làng, but shared their territory with two vạn: Vĩnh Thạnh and 
An Phú. Vĩnh Thạnh vạn was positioned within the territory of An 
Vĩnh village, while An Phú vạn overlapped with An Hải village. This 
arrangement survives today. Those who formed a làng, however, could 
not claim superior status on the basis of investment in rice cultivation; 
nor could they produce the crop that would rescue the village from 
starvation in times of famine. Unable to keep strict physical boundaries 
between the làng and the vạn, làng members of the two villages 
nurtured these separate categories through ritual and ceremony, and 
through claims that their ancestors were the first settlers on the island 
who tamed the new ‘wild’ land and founded the villages.
Drawing on the annals and local narratives, we know that the Hoàng 
Sa and Trường Sa navies that collected and traded goods from wrecked 
ships consisted of those who were members of the founding lineages 
and those who belonged to the organisation called vạn. Moreover, 
according to An Vĩnh temple’s records, the vạn in Lý Sơn was more 
than just a fishing organisation; above all it was a trading organisation 
(vạn giao thương), a point that I will develop in more detail later.7 
The  popular saying that fishermen ‘soak up wealth like a sponge’ 
(giàu bọt nước) hints at the perception that their profit was not morally 
justified when compared with the hard work of preparing the soil for 
cultivation (Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002:118). Coastal settlements were 
seen as the frontier of pirates and smugglers who could always find 
a good hideaway somewhere along the South China coasts (see,  for 
example, Watson 1985; Murray 1987; Kleinen and Osseweijer 2010). 
Michael Pearson (2003:6) wrote: 
[p]irates and fisherfolk are ubiquitous, the former to be seen as 
macroparasites, human groups that draw sustenance from the toil 
and enterprise of others, offering nothing in return, the latter equally 
predatory, for unlike peasants they extract but do not cultivate, take 
but do not give. 
7  See the Hán-Nôm document of Vĩnh Thạnh vạn in An Vĩnh commune, Lý Sơn Island.
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In this sense, fishermen were regarded by the agriculturalists as a 
‘world apart’, a group living in the margins of society, ‘savages’ and 
‘barbarians’, who did not really represent the traditional Vietnam 
(Nguyễn Duy Thiệu 2002). 
In his classical monograph on Malay fishermen, Raymond Firth (1964) 
demonstrated that in coastal areas, fisherfolk often live side by side 
with people of other occupations, including farmers with whom they 
maintain economic and frequently intimate relations. Pearson (1985:3) 
goes a step further by stating that ‘land and the sea intertwine in 
complex and various ways’, arguing that we must avoid seeing the 
people living on the shore as totally land- or sea-oriented. Indeed, 
Lý  Sơn’s cosmology looks both  to the mainland and to the sea 
as  sources of livelihood and as cosmological and sovereign centres. 
Yet the example of Lý Sơn shows that they dichotomise two modes of 
life — farming and fishing — even though in everyday life they might 
mix the two activities. The two vernacular terms — làng and vạn 
— appeared in almost every conversation with villagers, indicating 
that they recognise a social difference between the land and the sea. 
The distinction between the two territorial domains was manifested in 
the erection of two separate temples — đình and lăng — which marked 
spiritual and hierarchical boundaries between the land-based village 
and the fishing community.
Nevertheless, such distinctiveness between sea and land activities 
preserved in the social and religious organisations of the Lý Sơn society 
does not exclude the possibility that these two types of community 
are in a constant state of flux. The example of Thiên Y A Na — 
a Vietnamised Cham Goddess of Pô Nagar who is believed to secure 
the livelihood of the fishermen on the seashore — well illustrates 
this phenomenon. Whenever I attended anniversary ceremonies for 
Thiên Y A Na in An Hải village, I was always astonished by the large 
number of fishermen who visited her temple and took part in religious 
observance. While in this temple, the làng carried out an important 
ritual aiming to ensure the fertility of the land. I also witnessed 
fishermen sacrificing to the goddess — once they gave two, or even 
three, fine pigs. They explained that when the goddess blessed them 
with good catches or they escaped a Chinese coastguard they gave 
back to her more than was expected. The ceremonies always took 
place in the late evening, enduring for many hours and ending with 
a feast before the sun broke the darkness. 
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However, the làng was not always happy with the ostentatious 
sacrifices made by the vạn, and in some cases tried to regulate this 
matter. According to local narratives, in Lý Sơn at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, farmers found a whale beached on the shore 
just opposite the temple of the Goddess of Five Elements (Bà Chúa Ngũ 
Hạnh) which belonged to the village An Vĩnh. The villagers decided 
to include the seafaring deity in their spirit pantheon. The fishermen’s 
organisation of Vĩnh Thạnh protested and claimed rights to the beached 
whale. However, the farmers refused to yield and they strongly 
believed that the Whale Spirit chose their village to send rain in time of 
drought and to improve crops. Subsequently, the two communities of 
farmers and fishermen reached a compromise by building two separate 
temples called the Outer Dune Temple (Lăng Cồn Ngoài) and the Inner 
Dune Palace (Dinh Cồn Trong) to venerate the Whale Spirit, which was 
revered by fishermen and farmers alike under his full name ‘Great and 
Cruel General of the Southern Sea’ (Nam Hải Dạ Sa Ðại tướng quân 
tôn thần). It was decided that the fishermen’s anniversary celebration 
would precede the one organised by the farmers but it could not be 
held without the presence of the village elder — the ritual master of 
high sacrifice and representative of the founding lineage and hence a 
farmer — as a sign of the vạn’s respect for the village. In June 2007, I 
took part in the ceremony organised by the vạn. I witnessed that the 
vạn was not allowed to offer a pig, as this sacrifice was reserved for 
the làng, and instead was only permitted to present a chicken to the 
divinity. 
In saying that the islanders cognitively dichotomise the sea and 
the land, we should not associate their sense of territoriality with 
hierarchy, as enshrined in a permanent and immutable situation and 
structure (Kirsch 1973:35). Lý Sơn society is subject to a continuous 
process of change due to the ever-changing ecological, political and 
social conditions of its environment. Thus, the structure of the làng 
and the vạn in Lý Sơn is not permanent and static but constantly 
adapting to current situations. With a growing global demand for 
marine products and the global consequences of the South China Sea 
dispute, fishermen started to play a more important role in the village 
ritual domain to which the vạn had no previous access. Like in the 
past, when the feast in the đình served to increase status differences 
within the village, today the vạn uses the same means in order to earn 
‘permanent prestige and status relations’ as well as social recognition 
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(cf. Kirsch 1973:17). Renovating temples, appropriating the traditional 
right of the agricultural village to sacrifice pigs, and sponsoring village 
agricultural rituals became means of displaying their ritual ‘potency’ 
and thus their growing status in the Lý Sơn community. Each lavish 
sacrifice made by fishermen in agricultural temples served as evidence 
of their good catches and their material well-being and hence their 
spiritual ‘reward’. By resisting the exclusive ritual control of the làng, 
they turned the tables on the old hierarchy. 
This recent enhancement of fishermen’s economic position vis-à-vis the 
farmers and their ritual investment in agricultural temples reveals the 
complexity of local territorial imaginaries and the dichotomy between 
the land and the sea. It also suggests that fishermen are not just a 
disadvantaged group, but that they exploit the situation in order to 
demonstrate and cultivate their prestige in response to the changing 
political and economic context. This observation goes to the heart of 
Taylor’s (1998) argument that different modes of acting Vietnamese 
exist through time and terrain. Instead of looking at Lý Sơn villagers 
exclusively through the lens of the homogenising narratives of the 
nation, region, or historical process, it is worth remembering that they 
constitute not monolithic but rather heterogeneous entities entangled 
in complex relations in which they construct themselves within and 
across international, national, and local interests (Appadurai 1996).
Cosmopolitan Connections 
Lý Sơn villagers proudly talked about their ancestors’ engagement 
with other societies, and their extraordinary mobility and adventurous 
explorations to contest and change their present status as a remote 
or ‘sea-locked’ and ‘outlandish’ fishing community. Indeed, mobility 
and commercial networks between Cham, Chinese, and Việt across 
the South China Sea were long standing.8 Prior to Việt colonisation 
in the seventeenth century, Lý Sơn had been an important part of a 
network of wells providing fresh water to Cham sailors and foreign 
ships (Hardy 2009). Throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and 
nineteenth centuries, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa sailors capitalised 
on various cosmopolitan and commercial links in the South China 
8  For the region of the Mekong Delta, see Taylor (2007).
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Sea by gathering gold, silver, swords, ivory, porcelain, cloth, wax, 
and other goods from the wrecked ships in the Paracels and Spratlys, 
and supplementing them with a large quantity of mother of pearl, 
snail, tortoise, and sea cucumber, which were submitted to the royal 
court in Huế.́ The sailors were allowed to keep a significant part of the 
harvested marine produce for their own profit (Lê Quý Ðôn 2006:155). 
The impressive and well preserved ancestor house built during the 
reign of the Minh Mạng Emperor (1820–41) by the family of Mr Tư 
(b. 1930)9 — the uncle of my host on Lý Sơn — bears testimony to the 
extraordinary profits derived from that trade and extensive maritime 
networks that connected Lý Sơn villagers and Chinese. During their 
voyages to the Paracels, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa sailors occasionally 
met Chinese fishermen on the high seas and exchanged information 
(see, for example, Lê Quy Ðôn 1776:82b–85a in Nguyễn Q. Thắng 
2008). In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, some Fujianese 
or Hainanese who ventured into the Nanyang region (present-day 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) to procure their catches of the sea 
cucumber (hải sâm, bêche-de-mer) stopped in Lý Sơn to obtain fresh 
sweet drinking water and peanut oil for cooking. Mr Tư revealed 
that generations of his family had built their wealth on the lucrative 
trade that involved the sea cucumber — a highly appreciated delicacy 
among Chinese. For a long time, Lý Sơn villagers did not develop a 
taste for sea cucumber, but knew how to process the marine animal in 
order to sell the product in Hội An — a former Cham port that from 
the seventeenth century onward attracted many Chinese as well as 
Japanese, Muslim, and European merchants. 
Under French colonial rule, the Hoàng Sa and Trường Sa flotillas 
ceased to exist, but the seafaring capacity and trading profession of 
the islanders enabled their voyages to the south where they continued 
to explore new markets and expand their world and networks through 
translocal and transregional trade. The Lý Sơn seashore and adjoining 
waters were rich in fish, snails, sea urchins, and sea cucumbers, and 
provided trade for many. As the vạn in Lý Sơn functioned as a trading 
organisation, islanders traded with the mainland and sold whatever 
they caught and farmed: beans, peanuts, and — most famously — fish 
sauce, peanut oil, and fishing nets made of a special tree fibre (cây gay) 
grown on Lý Sơn. An informant from Lý Sơn explained that in the 
9  All personal names are pseudonyms.
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1930s his late father had worked as a ‘trader assistant’ (lái phụ) for 
one of the boat owners (chủ tuyền) on the island, travelling southward 
on the winter monsoon and returning northward with the summer 
monsoon. In November (lunar calendar), the northerly wind began 
blowing and in the following few months Lý Sơn people sailed to Sài 
Gòn for the Lunar New Year. The trip south was to buy rice, which was 
essential for Lý Sơn people’s livelihood. The father of my informant 
did not travel alone but was accompanied by a group of other sailing 
boats that followed him. En route, he made two important trade deals: 
he bought sugar (đường phên) in Quảng Ngãi and salt in Sa Huỳnh, and 
relied on established trade networks in Quy Nhơn, Nha Trang, and 
Hà Tiên. Disembarking in Sài Gòn or Cà Mau, he and the rest of his 
crew offered themselves as labourers to the French or Chinese, which 
gave them additional income for the purchase of rice. During March, 
the wind began to change course to a northerly direction, signalling 
the time for the return trip. In early summer, with a full load of rice, 
the group sailed in a northerly direction along the coast, passing 
different ports on the way. Since medicinal plants (thuốc nam) were 
highly sought after by islanders, Cham traders were welcomed on 
board, embarking at the port of Bình Thuận and remaining on board 
until reaching the island. The father of my informant would stop again 
in Sa Huỳnh to buy salt for resale in Lý Sơn. However, reaching home 
did not mean that the voyage was complete. Taking advantage of the 
southerly wind, he would resume his journey northward through the 
ports of Hội An and Huế where he would typically purchase blocks of 
jackfruit wood, for building ancestral houses, and Chinese porcelain, 
which was highly sought after by Lý Sơn islanders. 
The outbreak of the First and the Second Indochina Wars brought 
new political and economic pressures to the Lý Sơn people, who were 
trapped between two forces: the National Liberation Front and US 
troops. The strategic location of the island was used by the Vietnam 
Naval Forces — a command of the US Navy — to control passing ships 
and trawlers in the South China Sea but also by communist guerrillas to 
hide stolen weapons, for example. Lý Sơn fishermen were occasionally 
used by the Vietnam Naval Forces in military missions to the 
Paracels. However, in contrast to the mainland, Lý Sơn’s geographical 
position enabled it — to some extent — to avoid the turmoil of war. 
Importantly, most of the island’s religious structures survived the two 
Indochina wars, giving both the provincial authorities and the local 
CONNECTED & DISCONNECTED IN VIET NAM
364
community a clear stake in recovering local commemoration of Hoàng 
Sa and Trường Sa sailors and applying for national recognition of this 
ceremony. In the eyes of Lý Sơn villagers, this commemoration was 
testimony that they were not backward but using their trading skills 
and the seafaring capacity that connected them with the rest of the 
world. Forty-nine-year-old Lý described this in the following words: 
Previously Lý Sơn people used to go on sailing boats and, I think, 
because of that, having only sailing boats they were still able to go to 
the Paracels. They kept sailing to the Paracels not because of the royal 
order, which at that time was just a small part of their activities, but 
because the Paracels were located on the Silk Road, the trade route of, 
for example, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese; all kinds of people 
were passing there, so they [Lý Sơn people] followed that route and its 
trade up to the Paracels. There the Hoàng Sa flotilla was responsible 
for collecting things such as guns, steel or porcelain ... I am telling 
you some families in Lý Sơn if they traded they would get very rich. 
Lý Sơn was very rich so that the guiding principle of Lý Sơn [people] 
in that time was ‘to get rich one must do trade’ [muốn làm giàu phải đi 
buôn], or, as they put it, ‘without trade there will be no prosperity’ 
[Phi thương là bất phú] with the meaning that in order to get rich 
you must engage in trading, so those in Lý Sơn who did trade were 
economically better off.
When Lý said that villagers went to the Paracels regardless of the royal 
order, he meant that the islanders always had to strategise and seek 
various opportunities to make a living. He later added that Lý Sơn 
fishermen would continue to go to the Paracels or Spratlys without 
consideration for the state’s position for the same reason, because this 
is one of the very few options available to them to earn their living. 
While Lý sentimentally talked about the previous economic 
cosmopolitanism of islanders and their prosperity, he also depicted 
the dramatic changes and desperate years brought at the end of the 
Second Indochina War. The islanders’ mobility and trading networks 
were severely restricted after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, 
particularly in the period of the collectivist subsidy economy which 
lasted from 1977–86. Lý Sơn villagers reported shortages of basic 
necessities such as rice, sugar, and salt, which had to be brought from 
the mainland. To sail to Quảng Ngãi they needed to obtain special 
permission from the local authorities. Such permission specified 
clearly how many days they were allowed to stay away. On the day 
of the trip, their names would be called loudly by the authorities 
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and only after presenting a valid document would they be allowed 
to embark on the small motor boat. The islanders recalled that the 
boat was filled with more people than it could properly accommodate, 
and  many were forced to remain crouched or in an uncomfortable 
position for eight or more hours until reaching Sa Kỳ. Villagers still 
managed to smuggle local products, such as garlic and onion, to sell on 
the black market in Sài Gòn in order to buy rice to take home. Hidden 
in baskets full of vegetables, the rice was then illicitly transported 
by the boat to the island. Villagers recalled that they had so little rice 
that they cooked it with sweet potato in order to fill their stomachs. 
It was during this period that Lý Sơn people sought to ensure their 
livelihood by capitalising on their seafaring skills.
In 1982, Mr Nha (b. 1948) was the first fisherman on the island to make 
a daring journey to the Paracels — using a simple administration 
map stolen from the local People’s Committee office. Later in the same 
year he guided another seven fishing boats. Navigation systems or 
nautical charts were not available at that time, as the local government 
feared that fishermen might seek to escape the country by sea. 
Initially, in the Paracels, the fishermen caught mainly flying fish (cá 
chuồn) which could be preserved using salt, but one year later when 
the technology became more accessible, they expanded their fishing 
territories, catches and methods. Fresh fish from the Paracels and 
Spratlys was transported to Ðà Nẵng, where ice was also obtained. 
However, along with the new market opportunities that appeared, 
most Lý Sơn fishermen chose to sell their catch to local women traders 
in Ðông Ba market in Huế. In 1989, Lý Sơn’s fish trade was ultimately 
moved to Sa Kỳ port — the closest point between the mainland and Lý 
Sơn — where it began to operate under the Border Guard Command 
(Công an Biên phòng) which provided the logistical facilities for the 
development of the local fish market. 
In the early 2000s, due to regular fishing expeditions to the Paracels 
and Spratlys and a diving technology that uses compressed air, 
Lý  Sơn fishermen were able to collect the sea cucumber in deeper 
waters, and the old trade in the Chinese delicacy underwent revival. 
With the booming fishing market, some of the Lý Sơn people who in 
the late 1960s and 1970s emigrated to Quảng Ngãi, Nha Trang, or Sài 
Gòn saw opportunities for profitable business. They bought marine 
products from Lý Sơn fishermen and sold these to exporters, often 
of Sino-Vietnamese origin. The exporters provided credit to these 
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intermediate traders who, in turn, were able to connect with fishermen. 
Initially, the cargo of sea cucumber, shark fin and, occasionally, turtle 
and turtle-shell and sea urchin, was sent to urban markets in central 
and southern Vietnam for export to China and Cambodia, but more 
recent destinations include ports in northern Vietnam. In the north, 
out of sight of customs patrols, fish and various marine products from 
Lý Sơn are traded across the border at fishing villages of Móng Cái and 
transferred to Chinese fishing vessels at sea, or transported directly 
by Sino-Vietnamese traders to Guangxi, Guangdong Province, or to 
Hainan Island. 
This thriving trade of marine goods has been caught between two 
opposing forces — the liberalisation of cross-border trade between 
China and Vietnam, and the simultaneous enforcement of borders 
on the sea. Already under French colonial rule, China had begun to 
show interest in the uninhabited islands of the Paracels and Spratlys, 
and to assert claims over them. But it was not until decades later, 
in 2001, that China first denied Lý Sơn fishermen rights of use to 
fishing grounds which for generations they had considered their own. 
In 1982 — the year in which Lý Sơn people recommenced their trips 
to the Paracels and deep-sea fishing began — the legal regime of an 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) came into force as a new provision of 
the International Law of the Sea. Until then, national borders at sea did 
not concern Lý Sơn fishermen, but with the enforcement of the EEZ 
they found themselves accused of entering restricted zones illicitly. 
As the economic, political, and military powerhouse in the region, 
China’s expansion of an exclusive coastal economic zone resulted in 
the enforcement of a seasonal fishing ban, the seizure and detention of 
Vietnamese fishermen, and the destruction of their vessels by Chinese 
patrol ships. China’s introduction of a map (in 2009) that engulfed 
virtually the entire South China Sea further exacerbated tensions and 
incidents in the region, in spite of a common history of commerce 
and exchange, and a shared understanding of marine life as common 
property (Roszko 2015). As the tensions over the Paracels and Spratlys 
worsened, occasionally erupting into anti-Chinese protests across the 
country, Lý Sơn villagers preferred to maintain a low profile for their 
trading activities with China. 
The status of Lý Sơn as a restricted border zone impels Lý Sơn villagers 
to strategically preserve those memories of economic cosmopolitanism 
that figuratively bring the island closer to Vietnam’s ancestry and 
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fatherland, simultaneously obscuring those shared with the Cham or 
Chinese. In doing so, they selectively underline that Lý Sơn Island 
was not an isolated place, but one situated at the crossroads of the 
Silk Road trade routes that spanned China, Hainan, Nanyang, and 
the rest of the world. Articulating alternative accounts of their 
ancestors’ engagement in long-distance voyages at sea, local markets, 
and commercial networks, Lý Sõn people conveyed an implicit 
protest against their dramatic domestication and reductive narrative 
representations brought about by a centrally planned economy after 
1975 and the politicised South China Sea dispute. As a result, these 
proud and skilful sea navigators and traders with cosmopolitan 
economic networks — who once did not hesitate to advertise to the 
royal court in Huế about their risky but profitable operations at sea — 
became reduced to mere fishermen.
Staging Citizenship on the South China Sea
Seeking to become part of the modern world, the people of Lý Sơn have 
begun to contest their island’s marginal location and seek to represent 
it as a strategic link between Vietnam and the disputed maritime areas 
to the east. By claiming that they are historically and emotionally 
bound not only to their natal villages on the coastal mainland, but also 
to the dispersed islets of the Paracels where their ancestors worked 
and died during marine operations, they projected their own meaning 
of territoriality. In Lý Sơn people’s highly localised perception of the 
nation’s territory, the modern border line shifted from the island to 
the Paracels and Spratlys, expanding and making Lý Sơn a virtual 
centre of Vietnam’s territory, now comprised of both land and sea. 
Being marginalised and economically left behind after the 
re-unification of Vietnam in 1975, Lý Sơn fishermen and farmers 
aspired to be recognised as translocal and ‘cosmopolitan’ subjects 
whose identity in previous centuries was built on extensive trading 
networks, and the experience of far-distance travel and exploration, 
rather than exclusively on fishing. As Nina Glick-Schiller and Andrew 
Irving (2015) show, cosmopolitanism is an ongoing process that allows 
those who feel provincialised and marginalised to be attentive to 
global processes without compromising their local interests. In the 
case of Lý Sơn, recentring the country’s geo-body became a matter 
of integrating the mainland territory, the two disputed archipelagos, 
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the familiar system of ancestor worship, their cosmopolitan economic 
networks, and the sacrificed Hoàng Sa soldiers into a new rendition of 
the imagined nation.
Capitalising on a newly discovered patriotism among islanders and 
consciousness about protecting ‘ancestral lands’ in the ‘East Sea’, in 
2014 the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism selected 
Lý Sơn Island — considered a vanguard of Vietnam’s sovereignty — 
to host the national exhibition of Vietnam’s and China’s historical maps, 
under the slogan ‘Paracel and Spratly Islands belong to Vietnam — legal 
and historical evidence’. Most of the maps presented at the exhibition 
in a local museum were collected from various antiquarian bookshops 
around the world by Trần Ðình Thắng — a young Vietnamese who 
was born in Vietnam but raised in a foreign country. With the aim of 
raising morale among local fishermen and local soldiers stationed on 
the island, the exhibition on Lý Sơn was marked by the attendance 
of representatives of the Vietnam Naval Forces, central and local state 
authorities, and guest of honour Trần Ðình Thắng. The event was 
accompanied by a staged performance, including dance and patriotic 
songs, and widely broadcast in the national media. 
Until recently, the region of the Red River Delta in Vietnam was seen as 
the undisputed cradle of civilisation and representative of Vietnam’s 
‘authentic’ wet rice culture. However, the international debate over 
the South China Sea caused a significant change in rhetoric in Vietnam 
which redefined Vietnam from a rice-growing culture to a maritime 
nation (nước biển). Discursively, these territorial and mental shifts were 
marked by stories about the most recent ‘turn towards the ancestral 
sea islands’ (hướng về biển đảo quê hương) and the idea of Vietnam 
as a ‘nước biển’ (literally ‘sea country’, but more accurately ‘sea-
oriented country’), which is a contemporary invention of tradition 
that discursively places Vietnam in Tony Reid’s (1999) Malay World. 
Propaganda posters recently arranged at the front entrance to the local 
museum on Lý Sơn Island are part of that effort. The most interesting 
slogans proclaimed: ‘Vietnam is a maritime country’ (‘Việt  Nam là 
một quốc gia biển’), ‘The island is a home and the sea is a homeland’ 
(‘Ðảo là nhà biển là quê hương’), and ‘Each Vietnamese is a citizen of 
the sea’ (‘Mỗi người Việt Nam là một công dân biển’). While fishermen 
had previously been portrayed mainly in terms of socialist production 
— next to agriculture and forestry — the most recent Vietnamese 
state rhetoric turns Vietnamese fishermen into the heroic vanguards 
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of national sovereignty in the ‘East Sea’. Novel expressions of national 
identity and citizenship can also be seen in T-shirts bearing the 
slogan ‘Vietnamese nation is determined to preserve each plot of the 
Vietnamese land and sea islands’ (‘Dân Tộc Việt Nam Quyết Tâm Gìn 
Giữ Từng Tấc Ðất và Biển Ðảo Của Việt Nam’), or ‘Vietnam turns 
toward the East Sea’ (‘Việt Nam hướng về Biền Ðông’). These T-shirts 
became increasingly popular among many young Vietnamese tourists 
in Lý Sơn who wanted to publicly express their identification with 
fishermen and the sea.
I opened my paper with a vignette about a group of eight patriotic 
former policewomen who wished to express their solidarity with poor 
fishing families, who were suffering for the sake of the nation, through 
an act of compensation. Ironically, most of the families selected for the 
meeting with the former policewomen depended on agriculture and 
not the sea for their livelihood, as month-long fishing operations in 
distant waters required considerable expenditure on gear, vessel, fuel, 
and reserves of food. In spite of the diversity of livelihoods found 
on the island, the women saw its inhabitants exclusively through 
the prism of the highly politicised character of the South China Sea 
dispute. Pointing to a cultural and economic gap between those on the 
mainland and those on the island, they perceived the inhabitants of 
Lý Sơn as ‘nothing but sea people’ (‘người dân biển thì thế thôi’), and 
knowing hardly anything beyond living off the sea (biết chỉ làm biển 
thôi). Without help from the state — which was, for these women, an 
educator and patron of progress — the coastal areas such as the islands 
could not be developed. The women contested the islanders’ way of 
being Vietnamese, as certain customs on the island made them anxious 
— for example, they considered it unhygienic that many graves were 
located in the vicinity of human habitation. Although the women’s 
mission was to encourage fishermen to ‘cling to the sea, cling to the 
fishing grounds to defend national sovereignty’ (‘bám biển, bám ngư 
trường để bảo vệ chủ quyền tổ quốc’), they agreed that one could hardly 
consider Lý Sơn to be an attractive place to live, let alone a  tourist 
destination. One of the women said: ‘A touristic place is one of rest, 
entertainment and fun but there is nothing here’ (‘nơi du lịch là nơi 
nghỉ ngơi, giải tri và vui vẻ và ở đây chẳng gì có’). Her remark about 
the islanders’ pronunciation, which she found incomprehensible and 
odd, cast the islanders as somehow less authentically Vietnamese in 
comparison with the more ‘representative’ culture of northern Vietnam.
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Vietnamese tourists’ image of Lý Sơn as a navel of the nation was 
very much shaped by national media and recent tensions between 
China and Vietnam over the disputed waters in the South China Sea. 
Moreover, the media publicised contradictory images: on the one hand 
advertising Lý Sơn as a holiday destination with charming beaches, on 
the other hand underlining the island’s defence position and praising 
the extraordinary bravery of its inhabitants living under constant 
threat from China. As a result, many mainlander tourists imagined the 
island as a highly militarised place located somewhere in the vicinity 
of China, but soon experienced the absence of electricity10 and medical 
facilities, the conversion of beaches into garlic and onion fields, and 
the islanders’ ‘incomprehensible’ pronunciation. Taken together, 
these elements contributed to the perception of Lý Sơn as remote: 
a geographical and cultural backwater more suitable for a short, single 
visit rather than a longer stay. Most tourists perceived the islanders as 
an undeveloped fishing community bravely standing at the forefront 
of national sovereignty, in the very middle of Vietnam’s land mass and 
the sea, including the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. 
Lý Sơn people were aware of these various perceptions about them 
and that they were seen as strange, odd, and at times funny. They felt 
uncomfortable about mainlanders’ remarks about their local accent. 
For example, while they tended to appreciate my adoption of their local 
pronunciation, they immediately warned me that I was not allowed to 
speak ‘Lý Sơn language’ on the mainland, because they sensed that 
mainlanders would make fun of them. While they understood that the 
island’s location made it a vanguard of Vietnam’s sovereignty, attracting 
thousands of tourists and opening new economic opportunities, they 
still became upset if the national media stretched this picture too 
far. They were afraid that it might scare tourists and give a wrong 
impression of the island as a dangerous place. They were especially 
wary of crowds of journalists and local researchers who spent only a 
day or two on the island, chasing stories about fishermen victimised 
by a Chinese coastguard, or chasing elders and their family records. 
An outspoken islander woman expressed her opinion that real poverty 
on the island rarely attracted attention. Another fisherman complained 
that some journalists lost interest when they learned that the damage 
10  At the time of fieldwork, between May and July 2014, the installation of a submarine 
cable providing power supply to Lý Sơn Island was under construction. Electricity only became 
widely available on the island in October 2014. 
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to his fishing boat came not from a Chinese coastguard but from a 
short circuit. Others who renovated old guesthouses or built new ones 
worried about their business and wanted the island to be seen as a 
modern, safe, and attractive place for tourists. Situated on ‘a tricky 
double edge — both cutting and peripheral’ (Chu 2010:26), Lý Sơn 
people worked hard to recentre their marginal(ised) locality within 
the categorical order of the modern nation-state’s cartography (Malkki 
1992) by projecting themselves as cosmopolitan subjects. While they 
willingly shared with other Vietnamese a sense of being a ‘navel of the 
nation’ by claiming a twofold status, as an integral part of Vietnam 
and as part of the Paracel archipelago, they searched for their own 
context in the process of constructing their place within the nation’s 
historical narrative and territorial map. 
Conclusion
In his analysis of the local consequences of the international conflict 
known as the Taiwan Strait Crisis on Jinmen Island, Michael Szonyi 
(2008) vividly shows effects of militarisation slipping into the daily 
life of people and individual imaginations. Yet, in cartographic 
iconographies of Vietnam, it is the sea and its islands that have become 
conspicuously visible in arenas as varied as posters, stamps, logos, 
and museum exhibitions. In these changing aesthetics of the nation, 
the continental landmass becomes ex-centric and the margins become 
centred, culminating in the rendition of Lý Sơn as the navel of the 
nation. The island became a symbol of heroic sacrifice in the name 
of all Vietnamese citizens, who started to identify themselves with 
the ‘Vietnamese waters’. In the case of Lý Sơn, this aesthetic shift 
is accompanied not by militarisation but by a changing geography 
of affect (Navaro-Yashin 2007) by which people who have never 
been on the Paracels or Spratlys claim a deep emotional bond with 
these ‘ancestral’ places and the desire to defend their ‘sovereignty’. 
This  affect is performed in a wide variety of ways: walling Lý Sơn 
Island against Chinese; emotional demonstrations in the streets of 
Hà Nội or Hồ Chí Minh City against Chinese occupation of ‘ancestral’ 
seas; and mainlanders showing solidarity with islanders — supposedly 
victimised by Chinese vessels — through patriotic tourism, donations 
and cultural campaigns. The changing geography of affect creates new 
spaces for interaction not just between state and society, but between 
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different ways of acting Vietnamese. The affect provoked by the 
‘ancestral land’ of the deep sea, fishing practices, new maps of the 
national geo-body, new development plans, and a new style of patriotic 
tourism in Vietnam’s coastal areas illustrates the multitude of ways 
in which people respond to local and global economic and political 
discourses. In this same sense, the submarine cable that connected 
Lý  Sơn Island with the national grid and provided a steady power 
supply in 2014 has been rendered not only as an item of cultural and 
socioeconomic development, but as an act of maintaining security, 
national defence, and sovereignty.11
Thinking about the economic cosmopolitanism of Lý Sơn people 
requires recognition that cosmopolitanism is about various groups 
of people whose actions are situated in different political, economic, 
and social niches, and who are driven by contradictory goals. 
The  islanders’ expanding universe — embedded in and shaped 
by global competition for resources in the South China Sea — was 
largely based on their local experience of long distance commercial 
fishing and trading, which has been interpreted by a large part of the 
Vietnamese population as Lý Sơn’s determination to exercise Vietnam’s 
sovereignty. Indeed, Lý Sơn’s fishermen and farmers began to tie their 
identity to the state emergency in connection with the Paracels and 
with Lý Sơn Island’s geopolitical role in this international dispute. 
However, the narratives about Lý Sơn’s translocal and transregional 
connections to the sea could be read as villagers’ desire to go beyond 
the image of their heroic and geopolitical role in the South China Sea 
that reduces them to the ‘suffering subject’ (Robbins 2013). In their 
desire to be modern, progressive, and attractive for the tourist 
industry, they seek to stage their own roles in this global dispute. Even 
though they might complain about enclosures and appropriations 
of terrestrial and maritime commons, and about the way they are 
being depicted as uncivilised and not-quite-Vietnamese, they often 
embrace the opportunity to take centre stage and become the centre 
of the nation for the eyes of the world to see — if only temporarily. 
The domestication and instrumentalisation of maritime populations in 
performances of and for the nation paradoxically draws the periphery 
11  See, for example, www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2014/03/contract-inked-on-power-
supply-for-ly-son-island/, accessed 31 August 2015. 
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into the centre. For a short-lived moment, Lý Sơn people could be 
confident that their dispossession can be read as a sacrifice — willing 
or unwilling — for being the navel of the nation. 
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